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Abstract
Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil 
war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and 
rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratiza-
tion to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted 
key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect eth-
nic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of 
conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic 
civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially 
after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When dis-
aggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over ter-
ritory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that 
ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral 
violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely 
to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after 
noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce 
the risk of conflict.
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Following up earlier studies on democratization and the risk of interstate wars 
(e.g., Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Ward & Gleditsch, 1998), recent research 
examines how regime transitions and changes toward greater democracy 
affect the likelihood of civil wars (e.g., Cederman, Hug, & Krebs, 2010; 
Gleditsch, 2002; Mansfield & Snyder, 2007a). There is a clear motivation for 
doing so as many of the suggested causal links between democratization and 
interstate wars seem to apply equally well to incentives for civil wars (Mann, 
2005; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, 2005). More specifically, Mansfield and 
Snyder’s (1995) main argument relies on the diversionary incentives of elites 
facing pressures for political reform, whereas Mann’s (2005) reasoning is 
largely based on how ethnic cleansing and nepotism may arise when democ-
ratization forces leaders to be more dependent on securing popular support.
Much research suggests that democratization may affect the risk of con-
flict between states, stressing the potential tension of arguments about dan-
gers arising from democratization with the so-called “democratic peace” or 
absence of war between democracies. However, the case studies discussed in 
greater detail by Snyder (2000) and Mann (2005) include many examples of 
civil wars or conflict within countries.1 More recently, some studies have 
pointed to how democratization and competitive elections can increase the 
risk of conflict within countries. For example, Collier (2009) argues that elec-
tions in “dangerous places,” or states that already have a high prior likelihood 
of conflict, often appear to precede the outbreak of violence (also see Collier, 
Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008).
Although at least three existing studies have modeled the possible effects 
of democratization on civil war in their empirical specification (e.g., 
Cederman, Hug, et al., 2010; Gleditsch, 2002; Mansfield & Snyder, 2007a), 
there have been few explicit tests of the specific causal mechanisms postu-
lated in this line of research.2 In this article, we examine the effect of one 
specific causal factor related to various potentially conflict-inducing mecha-
nisms, namely, the holding of elections and how elections can shape incen-
tives to resort to violence. Although democratic governance is clearly about 
much more than elections alone, competitive elections play a central role in 
almost all definitions of democracy (for prominent examples, see Alvarez, 
Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski, 1996; Dahl, 1989, 1998; Karl, 1990; 
Manin, 1997; Schumpeter, 1942). Thus, in any case of a transition from an 
autocratic to a democratic regime, elections must be held at some point.3 To 
quote Bratton (1998), “While you can have elections without democracy, you 
cannot have democracy without elections” (p. 52).
Whether these elections are conflict prone is also of considerable practical 
relevance. Elections must be scheduled at some point in postconflict and/or 
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democratization periods, but there is considerable debate over the alleged 
advantages of early versus delayed elections. Our empirical results provide 
new findings that can help advance this debate. We show that ethnic groups 
with particular characteristics are more likely to engage in conflict after an 
election. More specifically, after competitive elections smaller ethnic groups 
are more likely to engage in territorial conflicts, whereas after both competitive 
and noncompetitive elections, larger groups are more likely to start a conflict 
seeking to replace the central government. As these groups are systematically 
excluded from government, our results provide policy-relevant insights.
In the next section, we offer a brief discussion of the existing literature 
suggesting that democratization may increase the risk of civil conflict. We 
seek to move beyond the existing literature by examining more specifically 
how elections may influence the probability of conflict and assessing the 
specific mechanisms. We first provide a statistical test of our arguments at the 
country level, similar to previous empirical research relating democratization 
to conflict. We then proceed to additional disaggregated tests, where we dis-
tinguish between the specific actors that may engage in violence in response 
to elections, relying on the new data set on ethnic power relations, and we 
consider different types of civil war in terms of the insurgent objectives.
Democratization, Elections, and Varieties of 
Civil Conflict
In this brief and selective overview, we start by considering democratization 
processes in broader terms and their possible relationship to conflict before 
turning to how incentives related to elections could give rise to conflict. 
Although the link between democratization and domestic violence is not 
necessarily limited to conflicts that involve ethnically distinct antagonists 
(see, e.g., Huntington, 1968; Przeworski, 1991), many civil wars clearly 
involve an ethnic element, and much of the recent work on how democratiza-
tion may cause internal conflict focuses specifically on ethnically diverse 
and polarized societies. This literature builds directly on classical studies that 
postulate that ethnic politics will have a destabilizing influence on demo-
cratic institutions (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972).
Two main conflict-inducing mechanisms have been highlighted in the 
more recent research on democratization and conflict. First, democratization 
is often linked to attempts by political entrepreneurs to make the demos coin-
cide with a given ethnos. Hence, such actors resort to ethnic cleansing and 
other forms of active discrimination, intimidation, and nepotism to ensure 
that the state serves the interest of particular ethnic groups (Mann, 2005). 
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Ethnicity tends to become much more salient in a more competitive political 
environment than in a closed political system, where politics is less depen-
dent on patronage and popular support. Collier (2009, p. 70), for example, 
argues that the Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga in 2007 ran on a plat-
form that in practice amounted to ethnic cleansing against the dominant eth-
nic group, the Kikuyus, who formed the main support base for the incumbent 
leader Mwai Kibaki. Moreover, public goods provision and access to state 
resources are often politically contentious issues in early phases of democra-
tization in ethnically segmented societies (see, e.g., Breton, 1964).
Second, the need to hold on to political power may lead incumbent leaders 
to “play the ethnic card” and incite hostility toward other groups under 
increasing political competitiveness. Mansfield and Snyder (1995), for exam-
ple, argue that
democratizing states are war-prone not because war is popular with the 
mass public, but because domestic pressures create incentives for elites 
to drum up nationalist sentiment. . . . Elites need to gain mass allies to 
defend their weakened positions . . . [and] often use appeals to nation-
alism to stay astride their unmanageable political actions. . . . 
Democratization creates a wider spectrum of politically significant 
groups with diverse and incompatible interests. . . . [W]here political 
parties and representative institutions are still in their infancy, the 
diversity of interests may make political coalitions difficult to main-
tain. Often the solution is a belligerent nationalist coalition. (pp. 88-89)
The principal mechanisms behind these arguments imply (a) that ethnic 
affiliation often dominates other cleavages in postauthoritarian political envi-
ronments and (b) that elites can strengthen their core support by raising ten-
sion with, or attacking, other groups. Since elites need to mobilize supporters 
to win elections, diversionary conflict—whether directed against other states 
or ethnic groups—arises as a consequence of mobilization efforts by elites 
emphasizing group differences and allegiances. As opposition groups often 
also engage in similar behavior, many observers point to the strong risk of 
ethnic outbidding in political mobilization in the wake of autocratic rule 
where popular support has played a minor role (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972).4 
The example provided by Collier (2009, pp. 68-75) of the Kenyan opposition 
leader Raila Odinga discussed above illustrates this point quite clearly.
The above arguments are implicitly linked to the role of elections as a fac-
tor and specific event that may exacerbate the risk of conflict (see Strand, 
2007). Mann (2005) argues that the demos is often defined in narrow terms, 
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resulting in the exclusion of other ethnic groups. In fact, the process of 
democratization may provoke active attempts of exclusion or intimidation, 
and such efforts often take on violent forms. Politicians running on exclusiv-
ist ethnic platforms typically try to prevent members of other ethnic groups 
from participating in elections, either on formal grounds or by undermining 
their ability to perform well in elections. Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995) 
argument about ethnic outbidding highlights how such political mobilization 
strategies may lead to the use of violence in election campaigns.
Moreover, violence may arise over the outcome of elections, either 
because of actual or perceived irregularities or if some contenders reject the 
official election results. Przeworski (1991) argues that democracy is not 
established as long as the losers of elections are not ready to accept defeat. 
Building on this insight, Strand (2005, 2007) relates elections to violence and 
finds that elections in incomplete democracies increase the likelihood of con-
flict breaking out. In addition, based on a game-theoretical model, he argues 
that second elections after a longer period without elections are especially 
critical (Strand, 2007; also see Bratton, 1998) Focusing on competitive elec-
tions in developed countries, Anderson and Mendes (2005) explore the link 
between electoral losses and protest behavior and find that political minori-
ties in new democracies are more prone to resort to violence after elections. 
Likewise, Collier (2009) highlights how “sore losers” in elections often may 
instigate violence after elections.5 These mechanisms can obviously apply to 
both ethnic and nonethnic conflicts. However, the ethnic affiliation of indi-
viduals is usually much simpler to establish than other political allegiances, 
which in turn makes it easier to target opponents in the aftermath of contested 
elections. The first and second rounds of the competitive presidential elec-
tions that took place in the Ivory Coast in the fall of 2010 provide good topi-
cal examples here. The challenger, Alassane Outtara, was credited with a 
narrow lead over the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo. However, unwilling to 
accept his defeat, and with the help of the Constitutional Council, the incum-
bent president Gbagbo held on to power, thus triggering ethnic tensions and 
violent conflict (“Ivory Coast Election,” 2010).
More generally, Collier (2009) argues that elections will only help ensure 
peaceful competition over political power if the rule of law is credibly guar-
anteed. When it is not, conflict becomes more likely since electoral outcomes 
are unlikely to be accepted by the losing parties (also see Strand, 2007). 
Mansfield and Snyder (2007b) make similar arguments in favor of “sequenc-
ing” democratization and recommend that elections should be postponed 
until countries have reached a sufficient threshold of internal stability and 
capacity for democracy (also see Brancati & Snyder, 2010, in press). 
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However, these claims are not uncontroversial, and delaying elections until 
countries are sufficiently stable in the aftermath of political turmoil may be 
neither feasible nor necessary (Carothers, 2007). Other scholars have chal-
lenged such a negative view of the dangers of “premature” democratization 
on empirical grounds. Birnir (2007) comes to the opposite conclusion, 
namely, that the first democratically held elections actually tend to stabilize 
ethnic politics. Her findings indicate that, in the long run, such a stabilizing 
effect may be sustained through inclusive representation of all ethnic groups 
in the legislative and executive process. Lindberg’s (2009) work on elections 
in Africa advances a related argument, namely, that repeated elections con-
tribute to successful transitions. Cheibub and Hays (2009) argue that elec-
tions may be a response to anticipated conflict. They argue that elections 
often can succeed in preventing violent conflict in democratizing regimes 
and suggest that the empirical evidence is consistent with this claim once the 
potential endogeneity is taken into account.
Previous research is somewhat inconclusive, in part because of different 
conceptualizations of regime change, in terms of both timing (i.e., whether to 
assess short-term vs. long-term changes) and type—that is, whether to focus 
on “large” changes between regime types or to consider changes across a 
continuum, including smaller changes in degree of political competitiveness 
that may leave institutions short of the minimum threshold for democratic 
practices. Based on an explicit measure of regime-type change, Cederman, 
Hug, et al. (2010) show that democratization periods appear to be more con-
flict prone than other periods. Their analysis, however, does not allow for a 
precise assessment of the causal mechanisms underlying the observed rela-
tionship, given its aggregated nature and focus on periods rather than specific 
actors and events.
Deriving Theoretical Hypotheses
In this study, we focus on causal mechanisms linked to elections as a way to 
render the analysis more precise than in previous work based on more sweep-
ing measures of regime type.
As we have argued above, some mechanisms linking elections to violence 
are potentially of a general nature and may apply to all political actors (e.g., the 
sore-loser effect), whereas others apply only to ethnic conflicts (e.g., competi-
tive ethnic mobilization). Overall, we believe that it is far more likely that the 
mechanisms will generate a higher risk of ethnic conflict and much less likely 
that elections should yield an increased risk of nonethnic conflict. Sore losers 
are often, although not always, linked to former combatants in previous civil 
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wars, and thus taking up arms after electoral defeat reignites ethnic civil wars 
(see, e.g., Collier, 2009; Höglund, Jarstad, & Söderberg Kovacs, 2009). The 
elections in the Ivory Coast of 2010 provide a good example, as the two com-
peting candidates come from different parts of the country and different ethnic 
groups. More specifically, the Constitutional Council invalidated mostly votes 
in northern Muslim electoral districts and thus provided an advantage to the 
incumbent, who enjoyed more support in the Christian southern part of the 
country (“Ivory Coast Election,” 2010). In light of this, we can state our expec-
tations about the effects of elections as the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The likelihood of civil war increases after elections, 
and this increase is highest for ethnic wars.
Elections, however, come in different shapes and forms and are held not 
only in democratic (or democratizing) regimes but also in autocracies (e.g., 
Levitsky & Way, 2002; Lust-Okar, 2006). Hyde and Marinov (2010) con-
vincingly argue that different types of elections can have quite distinct wider 
consequences. Partly drawing on their work and Birnir’s (2007) study of 
ethnic mobilization, we also expect that the causal mechanisms linking elec-
tions to conflict will operate differently depending on the nature of the elec-
tions. For instance, the sore-loser mechanism advanced both by Przeworski 
(1991) and Collier (2009) should apply only in competitive settings, that is, 
in elections where multiple candidates run for the same elected position. 
Note that these arguments are relevant regardless of whether the conflict is 
ethnic or nonethnic. Lindberg (2009, pp. 94-95), for instance, discusses the 
elections in Ethiopia of 1995 and notes that despite a partial boycott, none of 
the losing parties accepted the results (p. 180). Territorial conflicts broke out 
in 1996 and seem closely related to the prior elections. This reasoning leads 
us to the following hypothesis:6
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Competitive elections increase the likelihood of 
both ethnic and nonethnic civil war.
In noncompetitive elections, by definition, the sore-loser mechanism cannot 
apply, since the notion that actors are sore losers presupposes that the opposi-
tion’s misgivings must be at least to some extent unjustified. However, as we 
have seen, other mechanisms can still trigger conflicts. In case of electoral non-
competitiveness, there may exist groups that have been excluded from the elec-
toral competition at the outset and thus excluded from any meaningful potential 
access to political power. Such exclusion is likely to be especially entrenched if 
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supported by “sticky” categorical markers, such as membership in ethnic 
groups. Based on this reasoning, we postulate that noncompetitive elections are 
more likely to trigger ethnic, rather than nonethnic, violence:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Noncompetitive elections increase the likelihood 
of ethnic civil wars more than nonethnic civil wars.
Buhaug (2006) furthermore argues that specific incompatibilities of the actors 
delineate important forms of variation in civil war, and he presents evidence sug-
gesting that territorial and governmental conflict are generated by fundamentally 
different processes. Hence, it is necessary to proceed beyond distinguishing only 
ethnic and nonethnic conflicts and also to consider the specific incompatibility 
over which violence is used. Conflicts that hinge on territorial incompatibilities, 
such as civil wars involving movements that seek autonomy or independence for 
particular regions, are usually associated with distinct ethnic groups. However, 
governmental conflicts involve direct challenges to the center of the state and are 
much less likely to emanate from movements based on a specific ethnic affilia-
tion (indeed, many military coups may be seen as efforts by factions already in 
the central government or army to seize greater control). In the following, we 
consider mechanisms driving each type of civil war separately, starting with the 
mechanisms driving governmental civil wars.
We start by considering the electoral mechanisms that may trigger territorial 
civil wars. Marginalized ethnic groups that are small relative to the country’s total 
population are much more likely to pursue territorial aims, such as secession or 
various degrees of autonomy, rather than attempting to seize central state power.
For territorial civil wars, we thus expect that the election effect relates to 
conflicts over the very boundaries of the demos rather than to the exact power 
relations within it (Dahl, 1989). By inviting citizens to participate in national 
politics, elections imply a certain level of commitment to the polity as a 
whole, but disagreements over who is included within the popular unit cor-
responding to the democratic system may trigger conflict (Rustow, 1970). In 
particular, leaders of competing ethnic groups can use electoral campaigns to 
drum up support for secessionist or autonomist platforms that challenge the 
sovereignty of the state. In such cases, political violence may become an 
attractive alternative to democratic participation.
Given that the very definition of the polity is at stake, the demos effect 
should operate independent of whether elections are truly competitive or not. 
The resistance of ethno-nationalist groups that are unhappy with current state 
borders is unlikely to be mollified by competitive elections. This is so because 
elections tend to confirm, and render more visible, the current power struc-
ture, including structures of dominance and imposed “alien” rule.
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In brief, this reasoning yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The likelihood of territorial ethnic civil war 
increases after both competitive and noncompetitive elections.
Having briefly discussed our theoretical expectations as regards territorial 
conflict, we now turn to civil wars featuring direct challenges to the govern-
ment. Governmental conflicts are also likely to result from elections regard-
less of the degree of competitiveness in electoral politics. Yet for this type of 
conflicts, we differentiate between two main mechanisms that are associated 
with either type of elections.
Previous research (see, e.g., Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010) indicates 
that larger ethnic groups are generally more likely to become involved in civil 
wars with the state. Here we assume that the size effect is especially impor-
tant for governmental conflicts because only the largest groups are capable of 
or willing to claim central power (see Table A3 in the appendix (see online)
for a list of the cases where governmental conflicts follow elections).
In addition, we postulate that direct challenges to governmental power are 
more likely following elections because electoral events increase the level of 
political competition and lead to large-scale mobilization, especially where 
large groups are dissatisfied with the outcome of the election. Horowitz 
(1985, p. 331) describes how such “polarizing elections” are likely to pro-
voke ethnic coups. Thus, the sore-loser effect, whether driven by honest or 
dishonest behavior of the incumbent, should be larger wherever a larger pro-
portion of the population feels excluded from power. Events in the Ivory 
Coast illustrate this mechanism again quite clearly. The two groups facing 
each other in the dispute over the election result were both large, and the 
violence took place over the issue of control of the government.
Unfortunately, our election coding does not extend to electoral outcomes 
linked to groups. However, we can use the demographic size of the ethnic 
group in question as a proxy for the sore-loser effect.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): After competitive elections, large ethnic groups are 
more likely to fight the government than small ethnic groups.
Country-Level Analysis
An initial test of our hypotheses at the country level gives us the opportunity 
to check whether the families of mechanisms reviewed above appear to point 
in the right direction before proceeding to disaggregate by ethnic group and 
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on December 12, 2014cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
396  Comparative Political Studies 46(3)
conflict incompatibility. In this section, we propose a simple model consider-
ing the effects of elections on the risk that a country will experience conflict. 
The information on elections comes from data collected by Golder (2004) and 
Hyde and Marinov (2010).7 We consider only elections to national office 
(presidency or seat in parliament or constituent assembly) and the time period 
from 1960 to 2000 since Hyde and Marinov (2010) do not cover elections 
prior to 1960 and Golder’s (2004) data do not extend beyond 2000. To iden-
tify the subset of elections that are competitive, we follow Hyde and 
Marinov’s (2010, p. 8) classification, which, for an election to be competitive, 
requires that the following three questions be answered in the affirmative: “(1) 
Was opposition allowed? (2) Was more than one party legal? (3) Was there a 
choice of candidates on the ballot?”8 Since all elections extracted from 
Golder’s (2004) data sets occurred in developed democracies, we consider 
them competitive, except the elections in Portugal before 1974. As the criteria 
used by Hyde and Marinov (2010) suggest, competitive elections are not 
necessarily identical to “free and fair elections.” More specifically, whether 
elections are competitive could be determined ex ante, whereas assessing 
whether elections were “free and fair” required ex post information and thus 
is much more difficult to do in an objective fashion (e.g., Bratton, 1998).9
Our data on civil war onset are based on the Uppsala-PRIO Armed Conflict 
Data (see Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; 
Harbom & Wallensteen, 2009). To establish the involvement of specific eth-
nic groups in conflict, we draw on a new data project called ACD2EPR that 
information from the Non-State Actor (NSA) data on rebel groups in the 
Armed Conflict Data (Cunningham et al., 2009) and the Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) data set on politically relevant ethnic groups (Cederman, 
Wimmer, & Min, 2010). We code conflicts as involving ethnic groups if there 
is a clear link to rebel organizations, in terms of both their fighters’ ethnicity 
and their claims to operate on behalf of the group in question.10 We estimate 
a multinomial logit model,11 where we distinguish between the risk of ethnic 
and nonethnic conflicts, contrasting both to the reference category of no con-
flict. Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix list the relevant conflict cases, divided 
into ethnic and nonethnic wars. We also include a number of control variables 
commonly believed to be associated with civil war that may also plausibly be 
linked to democratization and elections, including the GDP per capita of the 
country in question, its population size, and the proportion of the population 
that is excluded from executive power according to the EPR data set (for a 
more detailed discussion of the control variables, see Cederman, Hug, et al., 
2010; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009).12 Observations with ongoing con-
flicts are coded as missing, and we address the potential time dependence of 
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conflict by using the nonparametric approach suggested by Beck, Katz, and 
Tucker (1998), including time since previous conflict (or independence) as 
well as three cubic splines on the right-hand side of the model. Table 1 reports 
the empirical results, with robust standard errors clustered by country to take 
into account variation across countries not reflected in the covariates.
In Model 1.1 in Table 1, we find a positive coefficient for elections on 
ethnic civil war, indicating that elections make civil war more likely in the 
subsequent year. However, the coefficient is at best marginally statistically 
significant and barely crosses the 0.10 level.13 We find a small negative coef-
ficient for elections on nonethnic civil wars, which is far from statistical sig-
nificance at conventional levels.14 In substantive terms, the probability of an 
outbreak of an ethnic civil war in a given year for an observation with all 
other variables held at the mean values increases from 0.004 to 0.007 in the 
year following an election.15 The risk of a nonethnic civil war decreases from 
a baseline probability of 0.014 to 0.012 in the year following an election. 
Hence, at the country level, the evidence for a positive effect of elections on 
civil war is not very consistent, and there is little evidence for any effect at all 
on nonethnic civil wars. In this sense, the results seem quite in line with the 
general findings regarding the general effect of democratization on civil war, 
where some country-level studies suggest a positive effect but the findings 
seem fragile and not very robust across alternative specifications.
Among the ethnic conflict outbreaks linked to elections in Africa for the 
period studied by Lindberg (2009), in two out of three cases the losers did not 
at first accept the election result. More specifically, competitive elections in 
Niger in 1995 and in Chad 1996 were both followed by ethnic conflict. In the 
case of Congo in 1992, the elections were also followed by an ethnic conflict, 
but according to Lindberg’s (2009) data the losers of the election actually 
accepted the election result.
Before distinguishing between types of elections, we briefly comment on 
the results for the control variables, which are largely consistent with previ-
ous research. The share of the population composed by ethnic groups 
excluded from executive power has a particularly large estimated positive 
effect on the onset of ethnic conflict, but the coefficient is smaller and less 
significant for nonethnic conflicts. Per capita income has a consistently nega-
tive effect on nonethnic civil wars, in agreement with Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). The negative effect is somewhat less consistent for ethnic civil wars, 
although the coefficient suggests a larger effect on the log odds of conflict 
(see Buhaug et al., 2008). Population size has a positive effect on ethnic civil 
wars but essentially no statistically significant effect on nonethnic civil wars. 
In general, our results support Buhaug’s (2006) claim that many features 
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have different effects on ethnic and nonethnic civil wars and that general 
results on civil war will reflect a mixture of the different and sometimes com-
peting influences of covariates on the risk of different types of conflicts (see, 
e.g., Hegre & Sambanis’s, 2006, sensitivity analysis).
Our second set of hypotheses suggests that the effect of elections on civil 
war will be contingent on their character, namely, whether they are competi-
tive or not as well as potentially their timing. Model 1.2 reports the results of 
a test distinguishing between competitive and noncompetitive elections. We 
find at best marginal support in these results for H2a—suggesting that com-
petitive elections increase the likelihood of both ethnic and nonethnic civil 
war—since the effects of competitive elections on civil war are positive for 
ethnic conflict only and negative for nonethnic civil wars. However, although 
the coefficients for competitive elections on ethnic civil war in Model 1.2 are 
of a magnitude comparable to the general effects of elections in Model 1.1, 
the coefficient just barely misses the .1 level in a one-tailed test.16 H2b—
arguing that noncompetitive elections increase the likelihood of ethnic civil 
wars more than nonethnic civil wars—also finds merely marginal support in 
the results of Model 1.2 since the coefficient for noncompetitive elections on 
the likelihood of ethnic civil war onset is positive (and close to significance 
at the .1 level in a two-tailed test) but negative for nonethnic civil wars.17 Our 
results thus suggest that sore-loser mechanisms could play a role in both 
competitive and noncompetitive elections. However, the relatively large stan-
dard errors imply that there is a lot variation across elections at the country 
level, and the general evidence for any positive effects of elections on civil 
conflict is at best weak.
Drawing on arguments by Bratton (1998) and Strand (2007), we distin-
guish first and second competitive elections from competitive elections in 
general (see Model 1.3 in Table 1). We consider as first competitive elections 
those polls that were preceded by a period without elections for at least 5 
years or noncompetitive elections. The results for Model 1.3 reveal that any 
effect of competitive elections on ethnic civil conflict seems to stem exclu-
sively from the initial competitive elections, as the coefficient from competi-
tive elections in general has a negative sign close to 0, reflecting that there is 
no tendency that competitive elections in general promote conflict. However, 
we have much larger positive coefficients for first and second competitive 
elections, and the positive effect is particularly strong for the second competi-
tive elections on ethnic civil wars. Substantively, the results imply an increase 
in the risk of an ethnic conflict onset from a baseline of 0.004 at the mean to 
0.016 in the year following an election.18 For nonethnic wars, the effect of 
second and first competitive elections is smaller. These results contrast with 
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those of Collier et al. (2008), who find a higher rate of conflict relapse in the 
year after the first election, which then decreases for the following election. 
However, it should be recalled that they consider only the effects of elections 
in postconflict states, and hence consider a much more restricted sample than 
our analyses, which include all states with new competitive elections.19
Although these country-level findings provide some support for the 
hypotheses on how elections may increase the risk of outbreaks civil wars, 
we cannot evaluate to what extent these results confirm that the groups actu-
ally engage in conflict in accordance with the postulated mechanisms without 
disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups. To do this, we now 
turn to our analyses of conflict at the group level.
Group-Level Analysis
Building directly on the EPR data set, we use as our units of analysis the 
individual politically relevant ethnic groups around the world from 1960 
through 2000 (Cederman, Wimmer, et al., 2010). Constrained by the avail-
ability of electoral data, this group-level data set covers all politically rele-
vant ethnic groups, irrespective of their size and access to national executive 
power. Apart from increasing the amount of information about individual 
conflicts and the involvement of specific ethnic groups, a group-level con-
flict analysis also has the advantage of not discarding information about 
whether other groups engage in conflict in the presence of conflicts by one 
group, as country-level analysis by construction disregards all the instances 
of peaceful groups in a country if a single ethnic group is involved in con-
flict. Consequently, although in our country-level analysis we have only 81 
ethnic civil war onsets (and 86 nonethnic civil war onsets), we have 127 
individual conflict onsets by ethnic groups in the group-level analysis.20 This 
allows us also to distinguish in a meaningful way among different types of 
conflicts that specific ethnic groups may engage in.
Before proceeding to evaluate our group-specific hypotheses, we first 
consider whether the main country-level findings reported in Table 1 can be 
replicated at the group level, or how the turn to disaggregated data may affect 
our previous conclusion on the general election effect (H1). Model 2.1 in 
Table 2 includes a number of group-level and country-level features likely to 
influence ethnic groups’ involvement in ethnic conflict. This list features a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the ethnic group was excluded from 
executive power as well as a variable measuring the group’s share of the 
country’s population (both variables drawing on the EPR data set). We also 
retain the main control variables from the country-level analysis that measure 
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the relevant state’s GDP per capita and total population. Finally, the models 
also feature a control variable that counts the number of prior conflicts that 
the group has experienced since 1946 or independence of the country in 
question.21
As can be seen, we again have a positive coefficient for elections (Model 
2.1), but since the coefficient is barely larger than its standard error, we again 
certainly do not find very strong evidence in favor of a general positive effect 
of elections on conflict. Before turning to the differences between competi-
tive and other elections and their sequence, we first briefly comment on the 
results for the other terms in the model. In line with previous scholarship, we 
find that excluded groups are much more likely to experience conflict, and 
conflict is much more likely in instances where a group has previously been 
involved in a conflict (see Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Average coun-
try income has a negative coefficient on the risk of conflict. Finally, total 
country size has a positive estimated coefficient on the risk of conflict, but 
this effect fails to reach statistical significance.
Model 2.2 examines whether the relatively weak findings for elections in 
general may reflect mixed effects of competitive and noncompetitive elec-
tions. This model provides at least in part some support for this view, as the 
positive coefficient indicates that ethnic groups become more likely to engage 
in conflict following competitive elections (and the coefficient is close to 
significance at the .10 level), whereas the estimated effect of noncompetitive 
elections is very close to 0. Together these findings strengthen our confidence 
in both H2a and H2b and confirm that the election effects for ethnic civil 
wars seem clearer when we look at all groups that might fight rather than 
aggregate ethnic conflict at the country level. Model 2.3 considers the differ-
ences among first, second, and other competitive elections. Again, we find 
that the increase in risk seems to follow from the first and in particular second 
elections, and that there are no effects of competitive elections in general.22 
However, neither of the terms for first or second competitive elections is 
clearly significant by conventional standards.
We now proceed to assess our hypotheses on the specific risks of territo-
rial and governmental civil conflict. Table 3 introduces three multinomial 
logit regressions. The simplest specifications, Models 3.1 and 3.2, examine 
the previous model specifications separating between territorial and govern-
mental conflicts. We now find much stronger evidence for significant impacts 
of elections on conflicts, and we note that the signs of the coefficient for elec-
tions differ for territorial conflicts (positive) and governmental conflicts 
(negative). Hence, the overall coefficient for ethnic conflicts in Table 2 will 
reflect an average across the two types of conflicts, where the two opposing 
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Table 2. Group-Level Onset of Ethnic Conflict, 1960–2000
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3
 
Ethnic  
civil war
Ethnic  
civil war
Ethnic  
civil war
 b b b
Electiona 0.279  
 (0.270)  
Competitive electiona 0.413 0.118
 (0.271) (0.409)
Noncompetitive electiona 0.041 0.039
 (0.427) (0.426)
First competitive electiona 0.409
 (0.504)
Second competitive electiona 0.541
 (0.497)
Group excluded 1.321*** 1.334*** 1.334***
 (0.261) (0.261) (0.262)
log(relative group size) 0.330*** 0.328*** 0.330***
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
log(GDP/capita)a –0.464** –0.471** –0.454**
 (0.147) (0.148) (0.149)
log(country population)a 0.122 0.121 0.124
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112)
Prior conflict 0.858*** 0.862*** 0.861***
 (0.165) (0.166) (0.166)
Peace years –0.076 –0.076 –0.078
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
Spline1 0.000 0.000 0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spline2 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spline3 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –2.099 –2.051 –2.211
 (1.244) (1.237) (1.265)
Observations 17,920 17,920 17,920
Log pseudolikelihood –683.685 –683.211 –682.682
Robust standard errors in parentheses
**Significant at 1%. ***Significant at 0.1%.
a. Lagged.
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effects wash each other out. More specifically, the results in Model 3.1 indi-
cate that territorial conflicts are indeed more likely after elections, as sug-
gested by H3.23 Model 3.2 shows that this election effect for territorial conflict 
is largely the result of competitive elections.24 By contrast, elections actually 
have a negative effect on governmental conflict onsets in Model 3.1, which is 
upheld for competitive elections in Model 3.2, where the effect becomes 
clearly statistically significant and has a larger impact on the log odds than 
the coefficient for territorial conflict. The results for the control variables are 
relatively similar across the two set of conflict outcomes and also similar to 
the results in Table 2.
When returning to our distinction between first and second competitive 
elections in Model 3.3, we find that the second competitive election again has 
a large positive (although statistically not significant) effect on the probabil-
ity of a territorial civil conflict, whereas the first competitive elections, 
although the coefficient is positive, have a much smaller effect.25 By contrast, 
competitive elections in general strongly reduce the likelihood of govern-
mental conflict, whereas the coefficient for first competitive elections sug-
gests a positive effect, implying that the first competitive election is almost as 
risk prone as a nonelection year. Finally, Model 3.3 also reports a strong 
negative effect of second competitive election for governmental conflicts, but 
strictly speaking this coefficient is unidentified since there are no govern-
mental conflicts after second competitive elections in our sample, thus the 
estimation of this effect is subject to a complete separation problem (see 
Zorn, 2005).
In Model 3.4 we investigate the size dependence of the electoral effects on 
civil wars (see H4). Model 3.4 introduces an interaction term between group 
size and both competitive and noncompetitive elections, which allows us to 
examine how the election effects differ from groups of different sizes.
The findings demonstrate a powerful and highly significant size-depen-
dent effect of elections.26 We depict the substantive effects in Figure 1. For 
territorial conflicts, we find that in the absence of elections, larger groups are 
marginally more likely to engage in conflicts. However, this effect is elimi-
nated or reversed in the aftermath of noncompetitive and competitive elec-
tions, respectively. This provides evidence against our H4.
Governmental conflicts in the absence of elections are more likely for 
larger groups. As Model 3.4 shows, competitive elections reduce the likeli-
hood of such conflicts, and the former also reduce the group size effect. As 
Figure 1 illustrates, especially for large groups, the joint effect of competitive 
elections leads to a slightly larger conflict risk. We find, however, a similar 
though smaller size effect even in the absence of elections. Similarly the 
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aftermath of noncompetitive elections is associated with a considerable 
increase in the predicted probability of governmental conflicts for especially 
large groups.
These results are important from at least two points of view. First, at the 
substantive level we find that elections have different effects for larger and 
smaller groups, and that the effects depend on type of the election (i.e., 
whether competitive and sequence order). Smaller groups are more likely to 
engage in territorial conflicts after elections. These groups are on the other 
hand almost never involved in governmental conflicts, whether or not elec-
tions are held. The same cannot be said for large groups. The latter are much 
more likely to engage in governmental conflict, and they do so especially 
after noncompetitive elections.
Second, our results also highlight how disaggregating our analysis enables 
us to detect what causal mechanisms may be operating in democratization 
processes in general, and in the aftermath in elections more specifically. 
Without the disaggregated analysis, the results of the effect of elections would 
reflect different tendencies that can cancel each other in the aggregate.
Conclusion
In this article we have explored the effect of elections on internal conflict or 
civil war from the perspective of ethnic groups, while taking into account the 
nature and specific sequence of elections. Although we find that the general 
relationship between a risk of conflict and elections is much weaker than 
often suggested by many observers, we do find that there are specific circum-
stances where the risks of conflict in the aftermath of elections can be more 
substantial. Our results demonstrate that elections appear to primarily gener-
ate ethnic civil wars, and our group-level analysis suggests that the electoral 
influence on conflict can manifest itself in different ways, depending on the 
type of ethnic conflict and type elections. We have shown that the problem 
of postelection violence primarily arises in the first two competitive elec-
tions, and that elections per se are not particularly dangerous. Moreover, the 
conflict-inducing election effect is mediated through the relative size of 
ethnic groups. Furthermore, we find large differences between the risk of 
territorial and governmental conflicts, suggesting that conflicts over the ter-
ritorial limits of a polity and the specific composition of the government in 
the wake of elections are driven by very different processes. Our study sheds 
light on the problem of postelectoral violence and the risks of conflict ema-
nating from democratization and greater political accountability. Because 
democratization is a notoriously difficult concept to measure, our focus on 
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elections offers a useful complement to previous democratization and con-
flict research. By disaggregating such effects, in terms of both the level of 
analysis and the type of conflict, we are able to come closer to the causal 
mechanisms that may underlie the outbreak of conflict in the wake of politi-
cal reform and democratization. At the same time, by focusing more directly 
on the ethnic groups involved in conflict, we can also offer insights into what 
power configurations are most at risk of postelection violence. As groups 
excluded from power appear to play a major role in these instances, this 
offers a policy-relevant insight that in the absence of an open political pro-
cess, elections are especially conflict prone (also see Höglund et al., 2009).
Yet our current analysis remains in many ways preliminary, and there is 
considerable scope for extensions and improvement in terms of both theory 
and data. More direct tests of the main theoretical explanations would be 
highly desirable. In particular, an evaluation of the sore-loser logic would 
benefit from data on electoral outcomes linked to the groups in our sample. 
Moreover, our group-level analysis leaves out an important layer of political 
actors, such as political parties and rebel organizations, which usually are the 
directly responsible and active agents in the outbreak of conflicts. Information 
about such organizations can be very helpful in further evaluating competing 
explanations of the influence of ethnic politics on civil war violence (see 
Birnir, 2007). The current research design, based on yearly observations, is 
relatively crude as regards the precise sequence of elections and violence. 
Event history analysis models, with more precise information about dates of 
elections and conflict onset, could improve the precision of causal inference, 
although the relative timing may be difficult to tease out without better data, 
especially since low-level conflict makes it difficult to pin down the specific 
violent events or any exact starting point for a civil war.
Our results suggest a more nuanced view of the perils and promises of 
democratization and elections than what has so far been offered in previous 
research. Whether, and to what extent, elections entail a risk of conflict 
depends on the character of ethnic groups in a country and their political 
status. Although there is a genuine tendency for competitive elections to pre-
cede conflict outbreaks, these are primarily limited to the first two elections. 
Integrating such knowledge on how elections may introduce incentives for 
ethnic violence with findings from the power sharing literature may further 
help make progress on devising practical measures to counteract such incen-
tives, including possible guarantees to prevent postelection exclusion and 
discrimination or proactive security measures, potentially including external 
actors under the auspices of international organizations.
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Notes
 1. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia clearly includes elements of both intra- 
and interstate conflict. Mansfield and Snyder (1995) also highlighted Rwanda as 
a supportive case for their theory, yet it is difficult to see how this can character-
ized as an interstate conflict.
 2. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001) also discuss the implications of 
the effects of democratization on civil war, but their approach does not explicitly 
consider democratization or changes in degree of democracy. In addition, Treier 
and Jackman (2008) and Vreeland (2008) suggest that the Polity IV indicators 
can be problematic for testing the effects of political regimes on conflict and 
argue that the estimated effects of changes in level of democracy (as reflected 
in the Polity scale) on conflict are reduced when these issues are addressed 
(although also see Gleditsch, Hegre, & Strand, 2009; Marshall & Cole, 2008).
 3. Obviously, elections are not limited to democracies but can also occur under 
authoritarian rule (see, e.g., Hyde & Marinov, 2010; Levitsky & Way, 2002; 
Lust-Okar, 2006).
 4. This idea of ethnic outbidding can be seen as predicated on Deutsch’s (1953, 
p. 104) idea of mobilization and assimilation as a source of national conflict. 
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However, Deutsch refers primarily to social rather than to political mobilization. 
Similarly, assimilation is not related to access to power since it again refers to 
social communication in the context of the dominant culture.
 5. See also the examples discussed in Hoddie and Hartzell (2005).
 6. Below, based in part on Collier (2009) and Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg 
Kovacs’s (2009) arguments, we will also assess the effect of the first and second 
competitive elections. We expect that the effects postulated in our hypotheses for 
competitive elections will be strongest in these cases.
 7. Given the different coverage and emphasis of these two data sets, we use as a 
starting point the Hyde and Marinov (2010) data and complete them with the 
information from Golder (2004) for the countries not covered in the first source. 
These countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and West Ger-
many. We code as first competitive election the following elections: (a) first 
competitive election after independence, (b) all competitive elections preceded 
by a noncompetitive election, and (c) all competitive elections preceded by 5 
years without elections. The second competitive election is the next election after 
the first competitive election, provided it is competitive.
 8. In an earlier version we followed Birnir (2007) and relied on International Insti-
tute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA’s) coding using the Quality 
of Government data set (Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & Rothstein, 
2009). Careful checking, however, revealed that the coverage of the IDEA data 
seemed incomplete, and they cannot be assumed to cover all elections.
 9. Obviously, the effect of elections might also differ according to other criteria, 
most notably depending on whether they occur in postconflict periods. Such 
other elements are, however, beyond the scope of this article and would need 
a more detailed theoretical treatment. We have checked the robustness of our 
empirical results, however, by assessing whether the effects of elections are 
different in postconflict periods and whether the distinction between presiden-
tial and legislative elections might affect our results. As the results reported in 
our online appendix (available at http://cps.sagepub.com) suggest, only minor 
changes appear for these different types of elections; hence, we refrain from 
discussing them here in the main text and will explore them in future work.
10. We use this conflict coding with a threshold of 25 battle deaths, while removing 
three instances where the United States is coded as being involved in an inter-
nationalized civil war, since these conflicts either did not take place on its core 
territory or did not involve indigenous groups. Years with ongoing conflicts were 
dropped from the analysis.
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11. We also estimated all the multinomial logit models reported as multinomial pro-
bit models, which are sometimes seen as preferable since they do not rely on the 
assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The choice of estima-
tor here does not affect any of the substantive interpretations, and we report only 
the multinomial logit estimates.
12. Elections, obviously, do not occur randomly, and thus our empirical analysis 
might be affected by endogeneity bias. For this reason we include a series of 
control variables that are known to be associated with conflict onset and that 
might also be related to the timing of elections (see Flores & Nooruddin, 2010, 
for a discussion of these issues). We believe, however, that election timing is a 
concern especially in postconflict situations (see Brancati & Snyder, 2010). As 
our robustness checks suggest, however, our main results do not differ in post-
conflict periods.
13. Given the yearly data, this coefficient is likely to be biased toward zero since 
in some cases an election and a conflict onset happen in the same year in the 
sequence expected according to our hypotheses. Our lagged election variable 
will, however, not pick up such civil war onsets.
14. All other variables were held constant at their mean values except the variables 
taking into account time dependence. All these were set to the values correspond-
ing to the closest integer of the mean number of peace years, namely 20. The 
standard errors for the two probabilities and the two changes in probabilities are 
0.001, 0.003, 0.002, and 0.004 respectively.
15. These, as all subsequent predicted probabilities, were calculated with the help of 
Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2003).
16. In terms of substantive effects, for a median observation profile, competitive 
elections increase the probability of an ethnic war by 0.002 (SE = 0.002) from 
0.004 (SE = 0.001) in the absence of elections, while increasing the probability 
of a nonethnic war by 0.001 (SE = 0.005) from 0.014 (SE = 0.003) in the absence 
of elections.
17. The substantive effects are as follows: Noncompetitive elections increase the 
probability of an ethnic war by 0.005 (SE = 0.004) from 0.004 (SE = 0.001) while 
changing the probability of a nonethnic war by –0.004 (SE = 0.007) from 0.014 
(SE = 0.003)
18. The standard errors for the probability and change in probability are 0.001 and 
0.008, respectively.
19. In robustness checks reported in our online appendix, we find that, however, that 
the results reported here remain robust even when we consider postconflict elec-
tions separately.
20. Of these, 78 are territorial conflicts, whereas the remaining 49 are governmental 
conflicts.
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21. As in the country-level regressions, we rely on logit models with clustered 
standard errors and the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) “peace year” correction. 
Observations with ongoing conflict are excluded.
22. We again provide predicted probabilities calculated while holding all variables at 
their sample means, whereas the peace years variable is set to 25 and the splines 
to the corresponding values. In the absence of elections we have a predicted 
probability of 0.003 (SE = 0.001), which increases by 0.002 (0.002) in the first 
competitive election and by 0.003 (0.003) in the second competitive election.
23. The estimated change in the predicted probabilities of a territorial conflict result-
ing from elections is 0.002 (SE = 0.001) from a baseline probability of 0.002 (SE 
= 0.001). The estimated change for governmental conflicts is a minuscule change 
of >-0.001 (SE = <0.001) from a baseline of 0.001 (SE = <0.001).
24. The probability of a territorial conflict increases by 0.003 (SE = 0.001).
25. The predicted change in probability for territorial conflict is 0.005 (SE = 0.002) 
for the second election and 0.003 (SE = 0.002) for the first election compared to 
a situation without elections. For governmental conflicts, the respective changes 
in probabilities are 0.001 (SE = <0.001) and –0.001 (SE = 0.001). As with the 
latter variable, there is a problem of complete separation; these results should not 
be taken at face value.
26. Birnir (2007) finds that the group’s size in the legislature has a negative impact 
on conflict, which is fully compatible with the results presented here.
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